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Abstract 
 
A growing body of literature has explored the effects of political tensions on international trade 
and consumers’ behavior. Still, little is known whether or to what extend it matters to 
corporations’ cross-border financing activities. This study fills such gap in the literature by 
investigating the impacts of the recent China-U.S. trade war on Chinese firms’ international 
syndicated loans. This quasi-nature experiment facilitates the difference-in-differences (DD) 
identification strategy and we use Chinese corporations seeking international borrowing as the 
treatment group and non-Chinese counterparties as the control group. Our analysis is taken at 
both the aggregate level and the deal level. Preliminary results suggest significant negative 
aggregate consequences, including the number of loan initiations as well as their amount. Deal 
level estimations exhibit the similar pattern: loan spreads and maturities were adversely affected; 
and sizes of syndicates became bigger and the probability of secured loan occurrence was higher 
for Chinese corporations. To substantiate the argument that the observed gloom was caused by 
the trade war, we adopt the triple difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation method by 
exploiting U.S. borrowers as an additional level of variation. 
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I Introduction 
 
Several decades’ economic and financial globalization have proven to promote economic 
growth (Dreher, 2006; Schularick and Steger, 2010). Firms’ markups were found to be 
reduced and productivities could be enhanced after trade liberalizations (Brandt et al., 2017; 
Baccini et al., 2019). Globalization might also bring some additional costs to the business 
world, as firms often confront political tensions to an extraordinary extend. Thus, it becomes 
pivotal to assess whether political conflicts between two nations have meaningful economic 
ramifications.  
 
Yet, the answer is still debatable among economists. On one hand, sunk costs provide 
disincentives for firms from changing their behaviors and there are empirical evidences to 
support the “business as usual” theory (Davis & Meunier, 2011). On the other hand, 
Heilmann (2016) finds a non-negligible effect on bilateral trade for some major political 
conflicts, especially for the Sino-Japanese event in 2012 and the Muhammad Comic Crisis in 
2005. Still, very few research is beyond the international trade context. 
 
In this paper, we reinvestigate the aforementioned research question by quantifying the 
impact on firms’ international borrowing under the backdrop of the recent China-U.S. 
political tension since it becomes increasingly important for corporations to have 
international capital access in the form of cross-border syndicated loans in recent years (Gao 
& Jang, 2019). We treat the initiation of the 301-investigation as the beginning of the China-
U.S. trade war and quantify the impact on firms’ cross-border borrowing by the difference-in-
differences (DD) estimations. 
 
It is found that both the total loan amount and the number of loan initiations made by Chinese 
firms declined following the shock. The loans of the Chinese borrowers-U.S. lenders were 
particularly affected relatively to other borrowers-lenders country pairs, as suggested by our 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimations. The reduction of the magnitude 
was similar to other economic and non-economic crises such as the 2008 global financial 
crisis and the Brexit vote in 2016 (Caporale et al., 2018; Tobias et al., 2019). 
 
We also analyze the impact at the facility level, since the drop observed by the aggregate 
amount could be purely due to the number of loan initiations. It is intriguing to see whether 
there were change for some important facility-level variables such as the maturity and the 
interest spread after the shock. It is observed that the loan amount at the facility increases, 
confirming the facts that the aggregate level results are driven by the number of loan 
insurances. Loan terms such as maturity and the spread experienced a significant upsurge 
when firms facing political conflicts. From lenders’ perspective, the risk-sharing behaviors by 
banks and other financial institutions have been altered. Specifically, the number of lenders in 
loan syndications with Chinese borrowers expanded; share of lead banks rose and banks were 
more likely to ask for collaterals (secured loan) for Chinese borrowers. Interestingly, loan 
maturities and lead bank allocations of the Chinese borrowers-U.S. lenders pairs were 
weakened, implying a major retreat of the U.S. lenders when evaluating the loans from 
Chinese firms. 
 
This research contributes to the existing literature in several folds. Firstly, our work relates to 
a growing literature concerning the impact of political tensions on cross-border economic 
exchanges. Existing research mainly focus on international trade relationships using 
aggregate level data (see Blomberg and Hess, 2006; Che et al., 2008; Du et al., 2008; Martin 
et al., 2008; Glick and Taylor, 2010; Heilmann, 2016; Lin et al., 2019; Barwick et al., 2019) 
and we shed new light on firms’ financing behavior by looking at their international 
borrowing utilizing the facility level data. 
 
Secondly, this research concerns an emerging strand of China-U.S. trade literature. Amiti et 
al. (2019) measures the prices and welfare effects on the U.S. consumers and Fajgelbaum et 
al. (2019) concludes that labors from tradeable-sector in Republican dominated counties 
suffered most during the trade war. Efforts have also been made to understand product-level 
trade in various markets (Flaaen et al. 2019; Hiller and Savage, 2019; Chu and Chu, 2019).  
We, in contrast, look into a non-trade effect through the lens of international borrowing. 
 
Our study is also in line with a recent literature regarding to the effects of policy uncertainty 
on real economic activities, since our major event is rooted due to the U.S. foreign trade 
policy (Baker et al., 2016; Gulen and Ion 2015; Julio and Yook 2016; Bonaime et al., 2018). 
Baker et al., (2016)’s seminal work shows that firms’ investment would decline during the 
periods with high policy uncertainty at both the micro and macro level. Gulen and Ion (2015) 
also confirms the negative relationship and further accesses the heterogeneous impacts 
among firms. While most of the existing works use the panel data setting and proxy the 
policy uncertainty by using the average index constructed by Baker et al., (2016), we adopt 
an event-study approach and explicitly study a shock relating to trade policy. Our study 
nourishes the understanding on firms’ borrowing behavior where very few existing policy 
uncertainty literature centers. 
 
Finally, this paper contributes to the literatures in cross-border syndicated loan (Beyhaghi et 
al., 2019; Giannetti & Yafeh, 2012; Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011; Carey & Nini, 2007; 
Houston et al., 2017). Our study mostly relates to the research signifying the shock 
transmission process. While existing works concentrate on financial crisis in 2008 (Giannetti 
& Laeven, 2012; De Haas & Van Horen 2012; Popov & Udell, 2012; Cerutti et al., 2015), we 
pay close attention on the escalating tension between China and the U.S. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the institutional 
background of the U.S. 301-investigations. Section III presents our data and the empirical 
frameworks. Section IV reports the estimation results and their implications. Section V 
concludes the paper. 
II Institutional background 
 
The fog of China-U.S. trade war emerged in late 2017. The United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) initiated an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 
on August 14, 2017, claiming that China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology 
transfer, intellectual property and innovation harmed U.S. commerce (USTR, 2018). A public 
hearing was held in October by USTR to collect written submissions of public comments and 
advices. On March 23, 2018, USTR declared to impose 25% tariffs on $3 billions of Chinese 
goods based on the 301-investigation results, involving high-tech industries such as 
aerospace, IT and automobile. In response, China imposed the equivalent tariffs on the same 
day. The trade war persisted and escalated until early 2019.1  
 
Economic indicators experienced a sharp slowdown in the global economy afterwards. In late 
July 2019, The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Update (IMF, 2019) lowered the 
predictions for global economic growth by 0.1% from the April WEO predictions owing to 
the weaker-than-expected global economic activity. 2 One of the important economic 
downside risks is the trade and technology tensions from U.S. tariff actions which diminish 
market sentiment and create headwinds for investment activities. Started from early 2018, 
subdued global manufacturing activity suggested weakened business and consumer spending 
amid the profound political tension. The slowdown is particularly significant in emerging and 
developing Asia. 
  
The stock market indices suffered after the unanticipated 301-investigation. The Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock indices fell 24.6% and 33.2% respectively in 2018. During the same 
period, the S&P 500 index has lost 300 points (11% loss of market value) due to the trade 
tensions. Moreover, the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index declined by 0.56% compared 
with the number in 2017. The sharp drops in key indices reflected investors’ rising concerns 
for additional tariffs and the impact on corporate earnings.  
 
Bank loan industry also bears pressures from the intensifying trade disputes and economic 
downturn. Under the context of debt-reduction campaign, China’s Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) had systematic difficulties in acquiring bank credits, as banks are 
curtailed by capital constrains in risky lending. The political tension between China and U.S. 
could potentially add another layer of risk margin, which further restrict SMEs’ access to 
international financial resources. In 2018, the people’s Bank of China lowered the reserve 
requirement ratio four times in order to meet the capital need from small businesses, amid 
 
1 However, on May 9, 2019, USTR raised tariffs from 10% to 25% on $2000 billions of Chinese goods. China 
responded by making the same move. In July 2019, China and U.S. initiated another round of negotiation 
regarding economic and trade frictions. Note that our sample is only available until the end of April 2019. 
 
2 In the updated version of WEO, global economic growth is forecast at 3.2% for 2019 and 3.5% for 2020. 
concerns over the trade tension. However, China’s loan data in early 2019 shows that banks 
are still reluctant to provide long-term project financing. The access to bank credit remains 
twisty. 
  
 
III Data and Methodology 
 
Our loan data is obtained from the Thomson-Reuters’ LPC Dealscan database, which 
includes detailed records of global loan tranches. Dealscan contains reliable information of 
the global commercial loan market and is also a standard database adopted by the syndicated 
loan literature (Chava & Roberts, 2008; Santos, 2011; Haselmann & Wachtel,2011; Francis 
et al.,2014; Chan et al., 2015; Houston et al., 2017; Caporale et al.,2018; Chu et al.,2019; 
Tobias et al.,2019). 
  
We include loans to firms from Mainland China made by foreign lenders from January 2010 
till April 2019 in order to minimize the potential problems caused by 2008 financial crisis.3 
Our initial sample is at the facility level and there could be multiple facilities in a loan deal 
(package). Basic information includes the borrower and lender names, their countries as well 
as the industries. Details relating loan characteristics and terms such as amount, pricing, 
maturity, types are also reported by Dealscan.4 Table 1 provides the definitions and sources 
of variables used. 
 
In addition, we drop all loans that are made domestically (i.e., lenders and borrowers from the 
same country) in order to obtain the cross-border loans.5 Since Dealscan categorizes 
borrower country according to firm’s physical location, we manually drop borrowers locate 
in Mainland China that are the subsidiaries of foreign firms. In addition, we exclude countries 
that are regarded as tax havens6 (Tax jurisdictions that are in the EU Hurricane and Non-
cooperative list) from our sample.  
 
 
3 We intentionally leave the before period relative long for the sake of the robustness of the estimation 
strategies. 
4 All loans are dollar-denominated and the information are recorded at their date of origination. As most of our 
sample borrowers are private firms, we have very limited access to their financials information. 
5 Deals involving Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan as lender or borrower countries are also excluded from the 
sample because of their unique political and culture proximity.   
6 The tax haven countries in the two lists include American Samoa, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guam, Korea (Republic of), Macao SAR, 
Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Namibia, Palau, Panama, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turks 
and Caicos Islands, United Arab Emirates and US Virgin Islands. 
 
Effects of Political Tension on Borrowing 
 
Effects on aggregate-level loan amount and issuance 
 
To examine the effects caused by the China-U.S. trade war, we use the difference-in-
differences (DD) estimation, which is adopted by some bank loans literature (Caporale et 
al.,2018; Chu et al.,2019; Tobias et al.,2019). We treat the incidence of the 301-investigation 
initiated by the U.S. president Trump on August 14, 2017 as the beginning of our shock 
period.  
 
We first examine the impact on aggregate level from the perspective of the borrowers by 
summing up the facility-level data up to their country level. The corresponding DD model is:  
 ln	(𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑝)./= 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/ + 𝛽7𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. +	𝛽=𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡. ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. + 𝛽?	𝑇𝑃𝑈/+	𝛽B𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ./ + 𝛽B	𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ./ + 𝛽G𝐸𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒./+ 𝛽L𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒./ + 𝛽N𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒./ + 𝜃. + 𝜖./ 
(1) 
 
where	𝑖, 𝑡 are the borrower country and year respectively. ln	(𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑝)./ represents ln 
(yearly aggregated loan amount + 1) and ln (yearly aggregated number of loan issuances). 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/ is a dummy variable equal to one for the post period and zero otherwise. 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟. is a dummy variable equal to one for the Chinese firms and zero 
otherwise. 𝑇𝑃𝑈/ represents the yearly average of China’s trade policy uncertainty index 
from Davis et al. (2019). This allows us to explicitly control for the potential trade policy 
uncertainty faced by all countries. 𝜃. is borrower country fixed effect, and 𝜖./ is the error 
term. We also control for borrower countries’ yearly-varying macroeconomic factors such as 
GDP growth rate, GNI growth rate, annual change of the nominal exchange rate, change of 
export and import amount (measured as a share of GDP) , change of domestic credit supply 
(measured as a share of GDP). The coefficient of interest is 𝛽=. The standard error is 
clustered at borrowers’ country level.  
 
To substantiate out argument that the lending was affected by the China-U.S. tension, we 
further use the following difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) that enable us to 
concentrate on lender-borrower pairs, i.e. (Chinese firms-U.S. lenders):  
 ln	(𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑝).R/= 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/ + 𝛽7𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. + 𝛽=𝑈𝑆𝐿R +	𝛽=𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/ ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. + 𝛽?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/ ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝐿R+ 𝛽B𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝐿R + 𝛽G𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/ ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝐿R + 𝛽L𝑇𝑃𝑈/+	𝛽N𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ./ + 𝛽U𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ./ + 𝛽2V𝐸𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒./+ 𝛽22𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒./ + 𝛽27𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒./ + 𝜃. + 𝛼R + 𝜖./ 
(2) 
 
where 𝑈𝑆𝐿R is a dummy variable equal to one for U.S. lenders and zero otherwise; 𝜃.	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛼R 
are the borrower and lender countries’ fixed effects respectively. Other variables are the same 
as model (1). The coefficient of the DDD estimator is 𝛽G. The standard error is clustered at 
the borrower country level. We present two versions of the results, one explicitly uses the 
trade policy uncertainty index (TPU) and the other uses the year fixed effects.7 
Effects on facility-level loan characteristics 
To capture the effects of political tension on loan-specific characteristics, we conduct DD and 
DDD analysis on multiple loan variables at the facility level. According to Melnik & Plaut 
(1986), loan contracts include both price and non-price terms. There are also correlations 
among those terms and Strahan (1999) noted that firms pay higher spreads with stricter non-
price terms. Therefore, we investigate both price and non-price terms, namely the loan 
amount, spread (which is defined as the loan pricing over the base rate), maturity, secured 
loan, number of lenders and the lender allocation. We restrict the analysis by syndicated 
loans only as it accounts for 99.42% of the sample observations.8 As syndicated loans have 
lender allocation information, we also investigate how lead banks change their allocations in 
loan facilities. We follow Ivashina (2009) and Chu et al. (2019) to identify the whether a 
lender serves as role of the lead bank(s).9 Our loan level DD model is thus specified as: 
 ln	(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑝).R[/= 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/ + 𝛽7𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. +	𝛽=𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡. ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. + 𝛽?	𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒/+	𝛽B ln(𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1)./ + 𝛽B 	ln(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)./ + 𝛽G ln(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)./+ 𝛽L(𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓	𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)./ + 𝜃. + 𝛼R + 𝜖.R[/ 
(3) 
 
where	𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘	and 𝑡 index the borrowing firm, lender, loan facility, and contracting time. ln	(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑝)./ represents the ln(loan amount + 1), ln(loan spread), ln(loan maturity), a 
dummy variable equals to one for secured loan and zero otherwise, the number of lenders in 
each loan, or lender allocation for the loan amount. Details for selecting the information on 
lender allocation will be discussed in the result section. Following Francis et al. (2014), we 
 
7 Note that it is not possible to simultaneously include the TPU and year FE and the latter would absorb the 
former index. 
8 According to the definition by Taylor & Sansone (2006) and Champagne & Kryzanowski (2007), a club deal 
is a type of syndicated loans with smaller amount and specifically requested lender participants. We therefore 
define syndicated loans in our sample whose are distributed through syndication and club deal. 
9 Based on the lender bank’s role definitions by Taylor & Sansone (2006), we alter the identification by 
excluding the “Lead Manager” and “Manager” roles since the titles are mainly for lenders with large 
commitment amount. In our final sample, we define lenders that act as “Administrative Agent”, “Lead 
Arranger”, “Mandated Lead Arranger”, “Book Runner” and “Agent” as lead banks. 
define	𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒/ as monthly change of China trade policy uncertainty index. 𝛼.	denotes 
the deal, industry, country, year and month fixed effects. Following the existing literature 
(Carey & Nini, 2007; Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011), we also control for amount, spread, 
maturity and number of lenders in the estimations where they are not dependent variables. 
We next use the DDD design to assess the China-U.S. pair effect at the deal level. 	ln	(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑝).R[/= 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/ + 𝛽7𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. + 𝛽=𝑈𝑆𝐿R +	𝛽=𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/ ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. + 𝛽?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/∗ 𝑈𝑆𝐿R + 𝛽B𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝐿R + 𝛽G𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡/ ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. ∗ 𝑈𝑆𝐿R+ 𝛽L	𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒/ +	𝛽N ln(𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1)[ + 𝛽U ln(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)[+ 𝛽2V ln(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)[ + 𝛽22(𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓	𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)[ +	𝛽27𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ./+ 𝛽2=	𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ./ + 𝛽2?𝐸𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒./ + 𝛽2B𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒./+ 𝛽2G𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒./ + 𝜃. + 𝛼R + 𝜖.R[/ 
(4) 
 
where all variable definitions are the same with previous models. Loan level controls are also 
added. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽G, which captures the average effect of political tension 
on the facilities involving an U.S. lender and a China borrower pair. 
 
 
IV Primary Results 
 
Evolution of syndicated loan amount and issuances 
 
To understand how the political shock affects syndicated loan, we plot the development of  
both the loan amount and the number of loan issuances for the treatment (China borrower) 
and control (non-China borrower) group, as shown in Figure 1 and 2. Noted that the sharp 
decline in 2019 is due to our sample construction10.  
 
In Figure 1, aggregate loan amount in treatment group is lower than the control group. The 
two groups also experience different borrowing patterns across the ample period. Comparing 
to non-Chinese firms, loan amount acquired by Chinese firms exhibit volatile movements. 
After 2017, the two groups observe a small divergence. In Figure 2, number of loan issuances 
present similar pattern between Chinese firms and non-Chinese firms. After 2017, number of 
loans obtained by Chinese firms observe a slight increase while non-Chinese firms mostly 
remain unchanged. 
 
 
10 At the time of data collection, Dealscan covers all deals until the end of April. Our final sample contains 
deals until 5th, April 2019. 
In both figures, Chinese firms experience a steeper drop in both the amount and the number 
of loan issuances obtained, indicates the potential role played by the political shock. 
 
Results from the aggregate level analysis 
Table 2 provides the aggregate-level results of model (1) and (2) without the inclusion of the 
TPU. Columns 1 in Panel A and Panel B show a negative and significant effect of political 
tension on aggregate loan amount and loan issuances. The results are consistent with the 
findings in the previous literature that aggregate loan drops after the shocks such as the global 
financial crisis and the Brexit vote (Caporale et al., 2018; Tobias et al., 2019). The results 
from the DDD estimations in column 3 of Table 2 also exhibit significant negative patterns 
for both the facility initiations and amount. It indicates a salient Chinese firms-U.S. lenders’ 
loan drop relative to other country pairs. As other borrower countries could also be affected 
by the Chinese trade policy uncertainty per se, we control for China’s TPU index in our 
frameworks to account for this spill-over effect. The DD and DDD estimates are quite similar 
after incorporating the TPU, which are presented in Table 3. It highlights that our results are 
not purely driven by the uncertainty generated by the trade policy. 
The aggregate level results show that political conflicts may restrain Chinese firms’ cross-
border capital access. Note the observed equilibrium decline might come from the supply 
rather than the demand side. As argued by Haselmann & Wachtel (2011), syndicated loan in 
large markets are risker. Consequently, foreign banks are unwilling to take the risks in large 
markets due to the concern to borrowers’ country risk. On the other hand, the drop in 
aggregate loan amount and issuances may also come from the demand side. Chinese firms 
facing large foreign political uncertainties may reduce their cross-border business, resulting 
in a reduced demand for project financing. Beckmann & Stix (2014) find that depreciation 
expectations for exchange rate reduce agents’ demand for foreign currency loans. This may 
serve as explanations for the demand-side analysis since exchange rate is negatively affected 
by political risk (Suleman, 2015). 11 
 
Results from the facility level analysis 
 
 
11 It is worth noticing that in the DDD estimations, the changes of borrower country’s domestic credit supply is 
negatively and significantly correlated with our dependent variables. This indicates that fluctuations, or 
uncertainties in domestic credit supply contribute to the reduction. This confirms the previous findings that 
firms with access to public credit markets are susceptible to exogenous fluctuations in the supply of capital 
(Lemmon & Roberts, 2010). 
Next we turn our attentions to the facility level loan outcomes. Table 4 and 5 report the 
facility-level DD estimation results for model (3). Column 6 in Table 4 takes care of loan 
shares and Table 5 re-calculated the weighted loan amount, which is the product of the share 
and the total loan in a syndication. Columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 4 and 5 presents the 
estimation results for the loan amount, maturity and spread. Interestingly, the facility amount, 
maturity and spread increased simultaneously after the shock. Combining the result with the 
drop of the aggregate amount, a plausible explanation is that the firms’ willingness of 
borrowing decreased owing to the diplomatic uncertainty and firms with inelastic cross-
border financing demand will borrow more to prepare for future needs, which is consistent 
with the arguments in Alexandre et al. (2014). The increase in spread might be due to the 
reason that banks exploited this opportunity and requested additional spread for the loan 
owing to the additional risks (Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011; Francis et al., 2014; Santos, 
2011). The spread decreases as loan amount getting larger, as showed by column 3 of Table 4 
and 5, which is consistent with the prior findings that larger loans carry lower spreads for the 
reason of greater borrower transparency and accessibility to capital market (Carey & Nini, 
2007). 
 
The number of lenders significantly increased following the political tension, as reported in 
column 4 of Table 4, indicating that lenders chose to share the risk by introducing more 
participants. On average, a loan after the political shock has 3.37 more lenders12 than before, 
which is in line with Caporale et al. (2018). Column 5 of Table 4 shows that the probability 
of secured loan raised after the political shock, which also implies that lenders’ escalating 
concern to borrowers’ default risk and demand more collaterals. Loan spread is found to be 
higher for secured loans, which is in align with Strahan (1999) that firms pay higher spreads 
with stricter non-price terms. Those results indicate that Chinese borrowers’ risk arising from 
political uncertainty is consistent among the price and the non-price terms. 
 
Column 6 of Table 4 limits our analysis to lead bank lenders only.13 It shows that the lead 
lender’s allocation significantly increased after the initiation of the trade war. Lead banks in 
 
12 Noted that in our sample, the base number of lenders is 1. Theoretically, syndicated loans have at least two 
financial institutions who serve as lenders. In our sample, 8.2% of syndicated loans are recorded as having 
single lender. According to He (2009), in syndicated loans that include indirect participation, the lead bank will 
transfer the committed loans to participated banks. Therefore, the contractual relationship is only made between 
the borrower and the lead bank, resulting in only one lender being recorded in the loan documentation. 
 
13 In column 6 of Table 4, the sharp decline of observation is reasonable since 72% of facilities in Dealscan 
lacks information on lender allocation (Chu et.al., 2019). There is little systematic differences between facilities 
syndicated loans bear fiduciary duty to other participants to monitor the borrower and update 
borrower information. Under the circumstances, lead banks will take a larger allocation in 
loans to guarantee the due diligence (Sufi, 2007). Thus, on average, banks that lead Chinese 
firms’ loans took more responsibilities after the shock. 
 
Estimation results for the DDD analysis of model (4) is presented in Table 6 and 7. For 
Chinese borrowers-U.S. lenders pair, both loan maturity and lead bank allocation decreased 
significantly after the political shock, which is the opposite from the previous DD analysis. 
We observe an increase in loan maturity after the China-U.S. political shock when consider 
lenders from all countries, as shown in Table 4 and 5. Haselmann & Wachtel (2011) provides 
evidences that syndicated loans led by foreign lenders have higher spread and shorter 
maturity comparing to those led by domestic lenders. Under the rationale that lenders usually 
prefer loans with shorter maturity in cross-border lending to limit credit risk, the observed 
increase in maturity in the DD analysis might mostly stem from the demand side. Our finding 
is consistent with the previous findings show that firms manage to acquire loans with longer 
maturities during a crisis (Alexandre et al., 2014). That is, Chinese firms demand long 
maturities after the political shock.  
 
As we turn to the DDD China-U.S. treatment group, a decrease in maturity indicates that the 
U.S. lenders (supply side) are unwilling to take the risk even with higher spread and more 
participants in a syndication. Moreover, lead banks from the U.S. reduced their committed 
allocation significantly, which is also rooted from the supply side. Similar implications 
emerge when comparing column 1 in Table 6 and Table 7. The loan amount increased 
whereas the share-weighted loan amount decreased after the political shock. Lenders’ 
committed amount reduced even for larger loans. This indicates a more severe reduction in 
loan allocation than the DD analysis when we consider global lenders.  
 
In sum, these results suggest that political tension between China and the U.S. yields negative 
impact on cross-border loans made by international lenders to Chinese borrowers at both the 
aggregate and facility level. Aggregate-level results observe a reduction in both loan amount 
and number of loan issuances. At facility-level, both price and non-price terms reflect the 
adverse effects of political tension. The tightening of loan terms become more severe when 
Chinese borrowers seek loan supplies from the U.S. lenders. 
 
with and without allocation information (Ivashina, 2009). Following Chu et.al (2019), we also drop packages if 
the total share is larger than 101% (we add 1% to account for the rounding error), which further reduced our 
observations. 
Robustness tests 
 
We perform robustness checks to examine whether our estimations comply with the common 
trend assumption underlying our DD strategy. Specifically, we test whether Chinese 
borrowers and non-Chinese borrowers exhibit similar outcome trends before the political 
shock. We regress the following model for the DD analysis of loan characteristics: 
 ln	(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷𝑒𝑝).R[/= 𝜂V + 𝜂2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑/ + 𝜂7𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. +	𝜂=𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑/ ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝐵. + 𝜃. + 𝛼R+ 𝜖.R[/ 
(5) 
 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑/ is a time trend variable. Definitions of other variables are the same 
with the previous model. The coefficient of interest is 𝜂=, which is the interaction term of 
time trend and treatment. 
 
Four out of six loan characteristics passed the test. From column 1 to 4 in Table 8, the 
common trend assumption is valid since the 𝜂= is insignificant in the four regressions. That 
is, there is little difference between Chinese firms and non-Chinese firms in terms of the 
facility amount, pricing, number of lenders and lender allocations. Thus, our DD strategy is 
valid for key variables at facility level. 
 
 
V Conclusion 
 
In this study, we contribute to the international political economy literature by investigating 
the effects of the recent China-U.S. political tension on Chinese firms’ international 
borrowing. By adopting the DD and DDD identification strategies, we find that at the 
aggregate level, loan amount and the number of loan issuances acquired by Chinese firms 
dropped significantly after the political shock. When jointly considering borrower and 
lenders, the Chinese borrowers-U.S. lenders pair were the most affected. Looking at the 
facility level, we observe an increase in the loan amount, maturities and the interest spread. 
Moreover, the probability of secured loan, the number of participants in loan syndication as 
well as the share of lead banks experienced an upswing following the political tension. 
However, for maturities and lead bank allocations of Chinese borrower-U.S. lender pairs, the 
political tension yielded negative impacts, indicating U.S. lenders’ growing concern to 
Chinese borrowers’ default risk. 
 
Our study provides some initial evidences on the effects of political tension between China 
and U.S. on Chinese firms as intentional loan, especially syndicated loan seekers and also 
Chinese borrower-U.S. lender as pairs. We look at approximately two years after while 
leaving six years before the political shock. As the trade war between China and U.S. has not 
ceased, more evidences can be obtained in the coming period of time. 
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Table 1—Definitions and sources of variables 
 
Variable Source Definitions 
Post Dealscan Equals one if the loan has been issued after Aug 14th and zero otherwise 
China Borrower Dealscan Equals one if the borrower is Chinese firm and zero otherwise 
U.S. Lender Dealscan Equals one if the lender is Chinese firm and zero otherwise 
Aggregate Amount Dealscan Natural logarithm of yearly aggregated facility amount (USD mil) 
No. of Issuances Dealscan Natural logarithm of yearly aggregated number of loan issuances  
Amount Dealscan Natural logarithm of individual facility amount (USD mil) 
Spread Dealscan Natural logarithm of loan spread over LIBOR (bps) 
Maturity Dealscan Natural logarithm of the loan maturity (months)  
No. of lenders Dealscan Number of lenders participating in the loan. 
Lender Share Dealscan A lender’s share of the loan amount (decimals) 
Whether Secured Dealscan Equals one if the loan is secured loan and zero otherwise 
TPU Davis et al. (2019) The yearly average of China trade policy uncertainty index 
TPU Change Davis et al. (2019) The monthly change of China trade policy uncertainty index 
GDP Growth The World Bank Annual percentage growth rate of GDP (%) 
GNI Growth The World Bank Annual percentage growth rate of GNI (%) 
Exchange Rate Change The World Bank Annual change of official exchange rate (local currency units relative to the 
U.S. dollar) 
Trade Change The World Bank Annual change of the sum of exports (% of GDP) 
Credit Change The World Bank Annual change of domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) 
Table 2—Effects of political tension on aggregate loan amount and issuance 
(without TPU) 
This table provides the results of the DD and DDD regressions of the yearly aggregate loan amount and the 
aggregate number of loan issuances before and after the political shock. The regressions are on the interactions 
of a Post dummy with Chinese borrowers and the former two with U.S. lenders. The analysis is based on data 
between August 14, 2010 and April 5, 2019, where Post equals one for years 2017 and 2018 (early 2019 is 
incorporated into 2018), ChinaB equals one for China borrowers and USL equals one for U.S. lenders. The 
dependent variables are ln(𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1) in Panel A and ln(𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟)	in Panel B. 
Column (1) is on the borrowers’ country level, column (2) and (3) are on the borrowers-lender pairs. Each 
regression adds country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the borrowers’ country level, 
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Log Loan Amount Panel 
 Single Borrower Borrower-Lender Pair 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Amount Amount Amount 
Post*ChinaB -1.000*** 0.210*** 0.224*** 
 (0.260) (0.0224) (0.0221) 
Post*ChinaB*USL   -1.522*** 
   (0.210) 
GDPgrowth 0.0159 -0.000282 -0.000281 
 (0.0461) (0.00355) (0.00355) 
GNIgrowth 0.0118 0.00211 0.00211 
 (0.0416) (0.00266) (0.00266) 
Tradechange -0.0804 -0.0271 -0.0271 
 (1.071) (0.0877) (0.0877) 
ExRatechange 1.569 0.0424 0.0425 
 (0.977) (0.101) (0.101) 
Creditchange -0.0568 -0.00505*** -0.00505*** 
 (0.0590) (0.00142) (0.00142) 
Constant 6.609*** 0.539*** 0.537*** 
 (0.126) (0.0118) (0.0118) 
Observations 847 95,265 95,265 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.836 0.349 0.349     
 
Panel B: Log Number of Loan Issuances Panel 
 Single Borrower Borrower-Lender Pair 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables No.of Issuances No.of Issuances No.of Issuances 
Post*ChinaB -0.321*** 0.0219*** 0.0266*** 
  
 (0.0949) (0.00519) (0.00502) 
Post*ChinaB*USL   -0.529*** 
   (0.0788) 
GDPgrowth 0.0132   
 (0.0160)   
GNIgrowth 0.00208 0.000589 0.000589 
 (0.0132) (0.000432) (0.000432) 
Tradechange 0.144 0.00449 0.00448 
 (0.453) (0.0205) (0.0205) 
ExRatechange 0.491 0.00491 0.00492 
 (0.390) (0.0281) (0.0281) 
Creditchange -0.0169 -0.00107** -0.00107** 
 (0.0187) (0.000426) (0.000426) 
Constant 2.674*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
 (0.0476) (0.00199) (0.00199) 
Observations 847 95,265 95,265 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.904 0.336 0.337 
 
Table 3—Effects of political tension on aggregate loan amount and issuance 
(with TPU) 
This table provides the additional results of the DD and DDD regressions after controlling the trade policy 
uncertainty of the yearly aggregate loan amount and the aggregate number of loan issuances before and after the 
political shock. The regressions are on the interactions of a Post dummy with Chinese borrowers and the former 
two with U.S. lenders. The analysis is based on data between August 14, 2010 and April 5, 2019, where Post 
equals one for years 2017 and 2018 (early 2019 is incorporated into 2018), ChinaB equals one for China 
borrowers and USL equals one for U.S. lenders. The dependent variables are ln(𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1) in 
Panel A and ln(𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟)	in Panel B. Column (1) is on the borrowers’ country level, column (2) and 
(3) are on the borrowers-lender pairs. Each regression adds country fixed effects. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the borrowers’ country level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Log Loan Amount Panel 
 Single Borrower Borrower-Lender Pair 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Amount Amount Amount 
Post*ChinaB -1.112*** 0.204*** 0.218*** 
 (0.242) (0.0222) (0.0219) 
Post*ChinaB*USL   -1.522*** 
   (0.210) 
TPU -0.00390*** -0.000676*** -0.000676*** 
 （0.00147） (0.000157) (0.000157) 
GDPgrowth 0.00509 -0.000549 -0.000548 
 (0.0474) (0.00358) (0.00358) 
GNIgrowth 0.00805 0.00226 0.00227 
 (0.043) (0.00265) (0.00265) 
Tradechange -1.759* -0.124 -0.124 
 (1.006) (0.0880) (0.0880) 
ExRatechange 2.602*** 0.0765 0.0765 
 (0.873) (0.0875) (0.0875) 
Creditchange -0.0572 -0.00597*** -0.00597*** 
 (0.0535) (0.00132) (0.00132) 
Constant 6.827*** 0.588*** 0.588*** 
 (0.174) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
Observations 847 95,265 95,265 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No 
R-squared 0.831 0.348 0.349     
 
Panel B: Log Number of Loan Issuances Panel 
   Single Borrower Borrower-Lender Pair 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables No.of Issuances No.of Issuances No.of Issuances 
Post*ChinaB -0.370*** 0.0209*** 0.0255*** 
 (0.0894) (0.00509) (0.00491) 
Post*ChinaB*USL   -0.529*** 
   (0.0788) 
TPU -0.00238*** -0.000200*** -0.000200*** 
 （0.000565） (4.87e-05) (4.87e-05) 
GDPgrowth 0.00885   
 (0.0163)   
GNIgrowth 0.000815 0.000562 0.000562 
 (0.0137) (0.000417) (0.000417) 
Tradechange -0.564 -0.0225 -0.0225 
 (0.403) (0.0221) (0.0221) 
ExRatechange 0.912*** 0.0151 0.0151 
 (0.339) (0.0237) (0.0237) 
Creditchange -0.017 -0.00130*** -0.00130*** 
 (0.0178) (0.000473) (0.000473) 
Constant 2.840*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
 (0.0717) (0.00534) (0.00535) 
Observations 847 95,265 95,265 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No 
R-squared 0.9 0.336 0.337 
 
Table 4—Effects of political tension on syndicated loan terms 
This table provides the results of the facility-level DD regressions for loan terms. The regressions are on the interaction of 
a Post dummy with Chinese borrowers . The analysis is based on data between January 1, 2010 and April 5, 2019, where 
Post equals one for the periods after August 14, 2017 and ChinaB equals one for China borrowers. The dependent 
variables are ln(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1), ln(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)	, ln(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)	,		𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓	𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑	and 	𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒	in Column (1), (2), (3), (4), (5)and (6) respectively. Column (1) - (6) are on the facility level while 
column (6) limits the sample to lead bank lenders. Each regression adds deal (package), industry, country, year and month 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the borrowers’ country level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Amount (log) 
Maturity 
(log) 
Spread 
(log) 
No.of 
Lender 
Whether 
Secured Lender Share 
Post*ChinaB 0.255** 0.193*** 0.268*** 3.365*** 0.0530** 0.0433* 
 (0.126) (0.0230) (0.0492) (0.998) (0.0265) (0.0237) 
Amount 
(log) 
 0.0280*** -0.125*** 0.336*** -0.00821 -0.0205** 
  (0.00730) (0.0101) (0.0814) (0.00516) (0.00818) 
Maturity 
(log) 0.272*** 
 0.0809*** 0.711** 0.0225 -0.00566 
 (0.0928)  (0.0248) (0.315) (0.0145) (0.00649) 
Spread (log) -0.773*** 0.0515***  -0.486* 0.0773*** -0.00822 
 (0.0434) (0.0167)  (0.259) (0.015) (0.0156) 
No.of Lender 0.0496*** 0.00367*** -0.00587**  -0.0026 -0.00732*** 
 (0.0114) (0.000849) (0.00230)  (0.00187) (0.00181) 
TPUchange -0.0153** 0.0112** -0.0133***  -0.00701 -0.00572 
 (0.00677) (0.00460) (0.00448)  (0.0064) (0.00780) 
Constant 8.624*** 3.518*** 5.874*** 7.785*** 0.274** 0.396*** 
 (0.409) (0.101) (0.130) (1.722) (0.124) (0.107) 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100,289 100,289 100,289 94,533 94,529 3,275 
R-squared 0.519 0.725 0.679 0.921 0.893 0.859 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 5—Effects of political tension on syndicated loan terms (weighted) 
This table provides the results of the facility-level DD regressions for loan terms weighted by lender allocations. The 
regressions are on the interaction of a Post dummy with Chinese borrowers. The analysis is based on data between 
January 1, 2010 and April 5, 2019, where Post equals one for the periods after August 14, 2017 and ChinaB equals one 
for China borrowers. The dependent variables are ln(𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1), ln(𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)	 ln(𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)	in Column (1), (2), (3) respectively. Column (1) - (3) are on the facility level. Each regression 
adds deal (package), industry, country, year and month fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the borrowers’ 
country level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Weighted Amount(log) Weighted Maturity(log) Weighted Spread(log) 
Post*ChinaB 0.104*** 0.0103 0.0115 
 (0.0290) (0.0285) (0.0387) 
Amount (log)  -0.0839*** -0.118*** 
  (0.0139) (0.0165) 
Maturity (log) -0.0799  -0.0552 
 (0.0549)  (0.0539) 
Spread (log) -0.0339* -0.0302  
 (0.0172) (0.0222)  
No.of Lender -0.0316*** -0.0163*** -0.0218*** 
 (0.00166) (0.00110) (0.00141) 
TPUchange -0.00275 -0.00186 -0.00864 
 (0.00836) (0.00726) (0.0122) 
Constant 0.670*** 1.172*** 1.619*** 
 (0.130) (0.195) (0.152) 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,956 15,514 15,514 
R-squared 0.706 0.467 0.446 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6—Effects of political tension on syndicated loan terms between China 
borrower and U.S. lenders 
This table provides the results of the facility-level DDD regressions for loan terms. The regressions are on the interaction 
of a Post dummy with Chinese borrowers and U.S. lenders. The analysis is based on data between January 1, 2010 and 
April 5, 2019, where Post equals one for the periods after August 14, 2017 and ChinaB equals one for China borrowers 
and USL equals one for U.S. lenders. The dependent variables are ln(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1), ln(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)	, ln(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)	,		𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓	𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑	and	𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒	in Column (1), (2), (3), (4), (5)and (6) 
respectively. Column (1) - (6) are on the facility level while column (6) limits the sample to lead bank lenders. Each 
regression adds deal (package), industry, country, year and month fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
borrowers’ country level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Amount (log) 
Maturity 
(log) 
Spread 
(log) 
No.of 
Lender 
Whether 
Secured 
Lender 
Share 
Post*ChinaB*USL 0.260*** -0.105** 0.188*** 1.191*** 0.0359*** -0.0495*** 
 (0.0973) (0.0467) (0.0629) (0.306) (0.0133) (0.00971) 
Amount (log)  0.0281*** -0.125*** 0.336*** -0.00822 -0.0206** 
  (0.00731) (0.0101) (0.0815) (0.00517) (0.00818) 
Maturity (log) 0.273***  0.0808*** 0.710** 0.0226 -0.00582 
 (0.0928)  (0.0248) (0.315) (0.0145) (0.00650) 
Spread (log) -0.773*** 0.0514***  -0.487* 0.0773*** -0.00823 
 (0.0433) (0.0167)  (0.259) (0.0150) (0.0156) 
No.of Lender 0.0496*** -0.00367*** -0.00587**  -0.00259 -0.00732*** 
 (0.0113) (0.000847) (0.00230)  (0.00187) (0.00181) 
TPUchange -0.0154** 0.0113** -0.0133*** 0.0346 -0.00702 -0.00574 
 (0.00675) (0.00460) (0.00447) (0.0952) (0.00640) (0.00781) 
Constant 8.622*** 3.525*** 5.874*** 7.789*** 0.274** 0.397*** 
 (0.409) (0.0996) (0.130) (1.720) (0.124) (0.107) 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100,289 100,289 100,289 94,533 94,529 3,275 
R-squared 0.519 0.725 0.679 0.921 0.893 0.859 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7— Effects of political tension on syndicated loan terms between China 
borrower and U.S. lenders (weighted) 
This table provides the results of the facility-level DDD regressions for loan terms weighted by lender allocations. The 
regressions are on the interaction of a Post dummy with Chinese borrowers and U.S. lenders. The analysis is based on 
data between January 1, 2010 and April 5, 2019, where Post equals one for the periods after August 14, 2017 and ChinaB 
equals one for China borrowers and USL equals one for U.S. lenders. The dependent variables are ln(𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1), ln(𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)	, ln(𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)	in Column (1), (2), (3) respectively. 
Column (1) - (3) are on the facility level. Each regression adds deal (package), industry, country, year and month fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the borrowers’ country level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Weighted Amount(log) Weighted Maturity(log) Weighted Spread(log) 
Post*ChinaB*USL -0.262*** -0.180*** -0.248*** 
 (0.0388) (0.0256) (0.0358) 
Amount (log)  -0.0150*** -0.0257*** 
  (0.00382) (0.00601) 
Maturity (log) 0.0155  0.0165 
 (0.0174)  (0.0120) 
Spread (log) -0.0456* 0.0295  
 (0.0263) (0.0264)  
No.of Lender -0.00386 -0.00427 -0.00392 
 (0.00347) (0.00375) (0.00463) 
TPUchange   -0.00860 
   (0.0122) 
Constant 0.670*** 0.286** 0.536*** 
 (0.130) (0.118) (0.0648) 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,956 14,956 14,956 
R-squared 0.706 0.809 0.805 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Test common trend in key outcome variables before the political shock  
(DD analysis) 
This table provides the results of the common trend test for loan terms. The regressions are on the interaction of a time 
trend variable with Chinese borrowers. The analysis is based on data between January 1, 2010 and August 13, 2017, 
where Year represent time trend and is equal to the year difference between the sample year and 2010. ChinaB equals one 
for China borrowers. The dependent variables are ln(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1), ln(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑),		𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓	𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, and 	𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟	𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒	in Column (1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively. Column (1) - (4) are on the facility level while column (4) 
limits the sample to lead bank lenders. Each regression adds deal (package), industry, country, year and month fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the borrowers’ country level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Amount (log) 
Spread 
(log) 
No.of Lender  
(log) 
Lender  
Share 
Year 0.00571* -0.0310*** -0.274** 0.00134 
 (0.00297) (0.00376) (0.107) (0.00120) 
Year*ChinaB -0.0146 -0.0139 -0.0176 -0.00375 
 (0.0267) (0.0129) (0.187) (0.00227) 
Amount (log)  -0.123*** 1.918*** -0.0210***   (0.0117) (0.288) (0.00328) 
Spread (log) -0.709***  -1.122** -0.00155  (0.0157)  (0.454) (0.00396) 
No.of Lender 0.0481*** -0.00517*  -0.00374***  (0.00166) (0.00276)  (0.000724) 
Maturity (log) 0.288*** 0.0453 -2.345** -0.00335 
 (0.0196) (0.0283) (0.950) (0.0119) 
Constant 8.194*** 6.092*** 14.87*** 0.283*** 
 (0.0967) (0.154) (1.709) (0.0274) 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 79,631 79,631 83,892 20,143 
R-squared 0.539 0.688 0.660 0.349  
Figure 1— Development of Aggregate Loan Amount (China vs. Non-China) 
This figure compares the aggregated loan amount acquired by Chinese borrowers (treatment group) to the 
aggregate loan amount acquired by Non-Chinese borrowers (control group) over the 2010-2019 period.  
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Figure 2— Development of Number of Loan Issuances (China vs. Non-China) 
This figure compares the aggregated number of loan issuances acquired by Chinese borrowers (treatment group) 
to the aggregate number of loan issuances acquired by Non-Chinese borrowers (control group) over the 2010-
2019 period.  
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Appendix Table 1—List of borrower countries 
This table provides the list of borrower countries in our final data set for both the aggregate and facility level 
analyses after the sample selection. 
Borrower Countries Observations Percentage (%) Cumulation (%) 
USA 79,699 46.28 46.28 
United Kingdom 12,201 7.09 53.37 
Turkey 9,414 5.47 58.84 
Germany 6,397 3.71 62.55 
Australia 5,982 3.47 66.02 
Canada 5,406 3.14 69.16 
France 4,844 2.81 71.98 
Switzerland 4,696 2.73 74.7 
Spain 4,606 2.67 77.38 
Netherlands 4,513 2.62 80 
Singapore 3,233 1.88 81.88 
Luxembourg 2,420 1.41 83.28 
Indonesia 2,354 1.37 84.65 
Bermuda 2,140 1.24 85.89 
India 1,812 1.05 86.94 
Italy 1,812 1.05 88 
Russia 1,749 1.02 89.01 
China 1,373 0.8 89.81 
Ireland 1,368 0.79 90.6 
Mexico 1,356 0.79 91.39 
Brazil 1,234 0.72 92.11 
Belgium 1,127 0.65 92.76 
Sweden 1,094 0.64 93.4 
South Africa 884 0.51 93.91 
Poland 554 0.32 94.23 
Japan 549 0.32 94.55 
Norway 450 0.26 94.81 
Egypt 438 0.25 95.07 
Finland 402 0.23 95.3 
Denmark 399 0.23 95.53 
Czech Republic 385 0.22 95.76 
Chile 378 0.22 95.98 
Oman 367 0.21 96.19 
Portugal 358 0.21 96.4 
Austria 356 0.21 96.6 
Qatar 352 0.2 96.81 
Vietnam 352 0.2 97.01 
Ghana 317 0.18 97.2 
Saudi Arabia 309 0.18 97.38 
Philippines 292 0.17 97.54 
Israel 255 0.15 97.69 
Malaysia 253 0.15 97.84 
Kuwait 228 0.13 97.97 
Mauritius 225 0.13 98.1 
Peru 207 0.12 98.22 
Hungary 204 0.12 98.34 
Greece 169 0.1 98.44 
Ukraine 164 0.1 98.53 
Monaco 162 0.09 98.63 
Kenya 160 0.09 98.72 
New Zealand 160 0.09 98.81 
Colombia 155 0.09 98.9 
Nigeria 154 0.09 98.99 
Romania 137 0.08 99.07 
Iceland 124 0.07 99.15 
Azerbaijan 113 0.07 99.21 
Cyprus 105 0.06 99.27 
Sri Lanka 101 0.06 99.33 
Thailand 97 0.06 99.39 
Malta 90 0.05 99.44 
Argentina 78 0.05 99.48 
Slovenia 77 0.04 99.53 
Angola 72 0.04 99.57 
Kazakhstan 68 0.04 99.61 
Lithuania 58 0.03 99.64 
Slovakia 57 0.03 99.68 
Bangladesh 54 0.03 99.71 
Belarus 33 0.02 99.73 
Pakistan 33 0.02 99.75 
Bulgaria 32 0.02 99.77 
Croatia 27 0.02 99.78 
Zambia 26 0.02 99.8 
Papua New Guinea 24 0.01 99.81 
Liberia 23 0.01 99.82 
Macedonia 23 0.01 99.84 
Cameroon 19 0.01 99.85 
Laos 19 0.01 99.86 
Gabon 17 0.01 99.87 
Jamaica 17 0.01 99.88 
Maldives 16 0.01 99.89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cambodia 15 0.01 99.9 
Jordan 15 0.01 99.91 
Guyana 14 0.01 99.91 
Costa Rica 13 0.01 99.92 
Dominican Republic 12 0.01 99.93 
Uzbekistan 12 0.01 99.94 
Congo 11 0.01 99.94 
Ecuador 11 0.01 99.95 
Botswana 8 0 99.95 
Guinea 8 0 99.96 
Moldova 7 0 99.96 
Ethiopia 6 0 99.97 
Honduras 6 0 99.97 
Madagascar 6 0 99.97 
Morocco 6 0 99.98 
Senegal 6 0 99.98 
Venezuela 6 0 99.98 
Paraguay 5 0 99.99 
Gibraltar 4 0 99.99 
Mozambique 4 0 99.99 
Uganda 4 0 99.99 
El Salvador 3 0 99.99 
Myanmar 3 0 100 
Nepal 3 0 100 
Tanzania 3 0 100 
Chad 1 0 100 
    
Total 172,200 100  
Appendix Table 2—List of lender countries 
This table provides the list of lender countries in our final data set for both the aggregate and facility level 
analyses after the sample selection. 
Borrower Countries Observations Percentage (%) Cumulation (%) 
United Kingdom 27,376 15.9 15.9 
Canada 21,447 12.45 28.35 
USA 21,046 12.22 40.57 
Japan 18,799 10.92 51.49 
France 18,018 10.46 61.95 
Germany 15,134 8.79 70.74 
Switzerland 11,529 6.7 77.44 
Netherlands 9,636 5.6 83.03 
Italy 4,256 2.47 85.51 
Spain 3,868 2.25 87.75 
Australia 3,647 2.12 89.87 
Singapore 2,996 1.74 91.61 
Norway 1,929 1.12 92.73 
Austria 1,554 0.9 93.63 
Ireland 1,367 0.79 94.43 
India 1,149 0.67 95.09 
Belgium 989 0.57 95.67 
Sweden 987 0.57 96.24 
Israel 493 0.29 96.53 
Malaysia 480 0.28 96.81 
Brazil 472 0.27 97.08 
South Africa 423 0.25 97.33 
Qatar 399 0.23 97.56 
Denmark 397 0.23 97.79 
Portugal 349 0.2 97.99 
Luxembourg 320 0.19 98.18 
Kuwait 276 0.16 98.34 
Lebanon 257 0.15 98.49 
Saudi Arabia 221 0.13 98.61 
Russia 209 0.12 98.74 
Thailand 187 0.11 98.84 
Philippines 180 0.1 98.95 
Jordan 154 0.09 99.04 
Indonesia 151 0.09 99.13 
Pakistan 135 0.08 99.2 
Mauritius 129 0.07 99.28 
Mexico 106 0.06 99.34 
Finland 91 0.05 99.39 
Egypt 89 0.05 99.45 
Turkey 84 0.05 99.49 
Albania 79 0.05 99.54 
Chile 79 0.05 99.59 
Poland 56 0.03 99.62 
Greece 55 0.03 99.65 
Czech Republic 52 0.03 99.68 
Malta 52 0.03 99.71 
Oman 48 0.03 99.74 
Morocco 43 0.02 99.76 
Nigeria 39 0.02 99.79 
Colombia 37 0.02 99.81 
Bangladesh 28 0.02 99.82 
Iceland 25 0.01 99.84 
New Zealand 25 0.01 99.85 
Zimbabwe 24 0.01 99.87 
Slovakia 22 0.01 99.88 
Togo 21 0.01 99.89 
Ukraine 21 0.01 99.9 
Gabon 19 0.01 99.92 
Ghana 18 0.01 99.93 
Sri Lanka 15 0.01 99.93 
Peru 13 0.01 99.94 
Venezuela 12 0.01 99.95 
North Korea 9 0.01 99.95 
Romania 9 0.01 99.96 
Cyprus 8 0 99.96 
Hungary 8 0 99.97 
Brunei 6 0 99.97 
Bermuda 5 0 99.98 
Kazakhstan 5 0 99.98 
Croatia 4 0 99.98 
Latvia 4 0 99.98 
Bulgaria 3 0 99.98 
Gibraltar 3 0 99.99 
Lithuania 3 0 99.99 
Macedonia 3 0 99.99 
Uganda 3 0 99.99 
Estonia 2 0 99.99 
Georgia 2 0 99.99 
Cambodia 1 0 99.99 
Cameroon 1 0 99.99 
 
 
Ecuador 1 0 100 
El Salvador 1 0 100 
Honduras 1 0 100 
Iraq 1 0 100 
Liechtenstein 1 0 100 
Papua New Guinea 1 0 100 
Slovenia 1 0 100 
Tanzania            1 0 100 
Vietnam 1 0 100 
    
Total 172,200 100  
